Translated with AI
Pravfond has been providing legal assistance to Russians around the world for more than a decade. Internal emails obtained by journalists show how it collaborated with spies, financed propaganda efforts and created points of influence along the way.
Under the guise of human rights advocacy, the state-backed Russian organization has for years advanced the Kremlin’s geopolitical agenda around the world, including funding the legal defense of alleged spies, criminals and propagandists.
Among the grant recipients are a taxi driver convicted of espionage, a man convicted in the Czech Republic of leading an armed gang during Russia’s annexation of Crimea, and an Australian activist who attacked an elderly Ukraine supporter.
The Foundation for the Support and Protection of the Rights of Compatriots Living Abroad, also known in Russia as Pravfond, began its activities in 2012. Its stated goal is to protect the rights of Russians abroad, primarily by providing them with assistance if they encounter legal problems.
Last year, a leak of dozens of documents revealed that Pravfond was linked to Russian intelligence and helped pay for the legal defense of notorious arms dealer Viktor Bout.
Now, an archive of nearly 50,000 Pravfond emails, obtained by journalists at Danish public broadcaster DR and shared with OCCRP and 28 other media partners, reveals the inner workings of a foundation used by the Russian government to advance its interests around the world — protecting spies, maintaining influence networks, and funding propaganda — all under the guise of fighting for the human rights of Russia’s “compatriots.”
The emails show that Pravfond made more than 1,000 grants worth millions of dollars to people and organizations around the world over roughly a decade. Despite European Union sanctions in 2023, Pravfond continued to send money to recipients in European countries, leading to multiple potential sanctions violations.
The emails also reveal how Pravfond collaborated with Russian intelligence officers to counter Lithuania’s prosecution of former Soviet officials and military personnel accused of war crimes during the country’s fight for independence from the Soviet Union.
“Countries don’t subsidize their citizens in foreign countries with legal costs,” said Edward Lucas, a senior fellow and senior adviser at the Center for European Policy Analysis. “So you have to ask why the Russian state wants to spend its tax revenue on this.”
“This is a classic example of a Kremlin influence operation — operating in the public eye and exploiting the inherently trusting nature of liberal society. … They say to these people: If you have any problems, we will pay your legal fees. And that sends a message: ‘We’ve got your back.'”
In keeping with its publicly stated mission, Pravfond provides assistance to ordinary Russians living outside the country, helping with issues such as custody disputes and access to mental health services. Pravfond has also helped fund more than 20 “legal support centers” for Russians living abroad, from Spain to Mongolia.
Credit: John Menard/Flickr
The headquarters of Pravfond is located near the famous Arbat Street in the center of Moscow.
But the organization has a particularly strong focus on the Baltics, with about a fifth of all known grants going to Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania. Ukraine is also well represented, as are many other former Soviet republics.
These are priority regions, Vladimir Pozdorovkin, deputy head of the Pravfond, wrote in one of his letters, because it is there that “our compatriots ended up involuntarily.” The idea that millions of former Soviet citizens in neighboring countries are still part of the Russian cultural and political world is enshrined in Russian federal law and is an important pillar of the Kremlin’s foreign policy.
The Pravfond also finances propaganda and influence operations. It paid for a Lithuanian history textbook justifying the Soviet occupation of the country, funded pro-Russian Telegram channels, and paid for a Baltic-focused news site to publish hundreds of pro-Russian articles.
Above all, his work underscores the Russian government’s view that Russians anywhere in the world can become instruments of power and influence.
“[Russians Abroad] are an army, a force that is very important to us,” said Pravfond executive director Alexander Udaltsov in an unpublished promotional video found in the organization’s emails.
Representatives of several European intelligence agencies told OCCRP that they believe Pravfond is acting beyond its stated mission, acting as a tool of Russian intelligence services.
“The foundation was created to finance influence operations under the guise of combating discrimination,” said Marta Tuul, a spokeswoman for KAPO, the Estonian security service. “It is an extension of the Russian intelligence services to control and direct the Russian-speaking diaspora.”
Normunds Mežviecs, director of the Latvian State Security Service, said his agency has been investigating Pravfond for many years.
“We saw… that in connection with this fund, individuals who present themselves as independent, so to speak, experts, researchers, employees of this fund, are in fact career employees of the Russian special services,” Mezhvits said. He did not give any specific examples.
Andrei Soldatov, a Russian investigative journalist and expert on the country’s intelligence services, said it would make sense to conduct covert work under the guise of legitimate legal assistance.
“It is becoming increasingly difficult to provide cover for Russian intelligence agents today,” Soldatov said. “Embassies are not as big as they used to be. Russian cultural centers have been closed in many countries.”
“But if you create a flow, a flow of legal services provided to the Russian community, of course, that will make it easier. … It will give your spies new legal cover.”
Pravfond, its director Udaltsov and deputy director Pozdorovkin did not respond to requests for comment on the situation.
About the letters of Pravfond
The letters from Pravfond received by journalists came from several mailboxes, including the organization’s main address, as well as from the personal addresses of Pravfond’s deputy head Pozdorovkin and former head Igor Panevkin, who died last year.
Covering the period from the company’s founding in 2012 to November 2024, they provide a comprehensive picture of the company’s day-to-day operations, which were carried out by about 18 employees in an office located near the famous pedestrian Arbat Street in central Moscow.
The contract numbering system used by Pravfond suggests it has awarded more than 1,000 grants since 2012. Journalists found more than 360 of them in an email archive, along with extensive documentation. The average grant was about $16,500, though some recipients received more than one.
Paramilitary leader, taxi driver spy and ‘Australian Cossack’
Dressed all in black, Alexander Franchetti sits on a rock opposite Sevastopol Bay and calmly describes how he formed a paramilitary group in Crimea after Russia invaded the peninsula in 2014.
“In three days we formed the first part of our group, five people,” says the former Russian fitness trainer who lived in Prague for many years, in an interview posted on YouTube . “They were scouts; we selected people who could read the forest.”
Franchetti makes no attempt to hide how his dozen-strong armed group, called “North Wind,” collaborated with the Russian military. “We passed on all the information to the naval command,” he recalls.
Credit: Screenshot of video posted by @svideobiz/Youtube
Alexander Franchetti gives an interview in Crimea.
Years later, as international law began to catch up, Pravfond came to the rescue. The organization provided at least three grants totaling more than 3.4 million rubles ($37,000) to pay for several lawyers and a translator who worked to defend Franchetti after he was detained at Prague airport in September 2021 at Ukraine’s request. (It’s unclear whether all of that money ever reached its intended recipients, since Franchetti and his supporters encountered obstacles in handing over some of the later batches, according to the documents.)
Although the highest court ultimately ruled against his extradition to Ukraine, Czech law enforcement immediately filed new domestic charges, accusing Franchetti and his group of facilitating sabotage operations, reconnaissance of energy infrastructure, and spying on Ukrainian government forces.
Franchetti was acquitted in October 2022. While prosecutors’ appeal was still pending, he quickly fled to Russia. The following year, his acquittal was overturned and he was sentenced to prison in absentia. He did not respond to a request for comment.
Franchetti was not alone – Pravfond emails show how the foundation repeatedly helped “compatriots” arrested for supporting Russia’s military or ideological goals.
In Latvia, the group backed a man recruited to spy for Russia via a Telegram channel. Sergei Sidorov, a taxi driver, was arrested by the country’s security services in 2023. According to media reports from the trial, prosecutors accused Sidorov of photographing military installations and buildings with the Ukrainian flag, as well as plotting to bomb a drone testing site near Riga.
The Pravfond gave him €5,000 ($5,340) for his legal defense. He was convicted of espionage and given a seven-year prison sentence, which he is currently appealing. Sidorov is also back on trial after being charged with espionage in a new case. When asked to comment, Sidorov wrote that he only photographed public places, not military installations, that his plans to blow up the drone site were “just words” that he quickly forgot, and that he never had direct contact with any security services.
Another case in Australia demonstrates Pravfond’s lobbying skills with the Russian government – sometimes as valuable as its financial support.
Simeon Boykov, who calls himself the “Australian Cossack,” is a prominent pro-Russian activist from Sydney. Having gained a following in part by promoting anti-vaccine conspiracies during the COVID pandemic, Boykov has become widely known for his public advocacy of Russian interests, particularly since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
Credit: Richard Milnes/Alamy Stock Photo
Pro-Russian activist Semyon Boykov during a protest against mandatory COVID-19 vaccination in Sydney, Australia, in 2022.
With his provocative antics and self-proclaimed “Ataman of the Australian Cossacks ,” Boykov cuts a somewhat comical figure. But he has also been convicted of assault. After injuring an elderly Ukrainian supporter in a public altercation in December 2022, Boykov took refuge in the Russian consulate in Sydney to avoid arrest.
Boykov’s wife sought legal assistance from Pravfond at least three times, and the organization helped him at least once by describing him in internal documents and letters to various Russian diplomatic agencies as being unfairly persecuted for expressing pro-Russian views.
Pravfond also used its many connections to Boykov’s advantage. After his retreat to the consulate, Boykov complained of poor treatment by the consul, who, he wrote, “dreams of handing me over to the Australian police.” In response, Pravfond held meetings with senior Russian diplomats and wrote letters lobbying for Boykov’s interests.
Most importantly, it also appears to have pushed him toward naturalization, leading to President Putin’s 2023 decree granting him Russian citizenship. “I express my sincere gratitude for your help in resolving this issue,” he wrote in Pravfond. “This is a huge, joyful event that I have been striving for for many years.”
Boykov, who still lives in the consulate, continues to broadcast pro-Russian content to nearly 90,000 Telegram subscribers. For a time, he even registered with the Australian government as a correspondent for Russia Today. His case is presented as a success story in the Pravfond’s draft 2022 annual report, found in the emails.
Credit: Sissi Reyes/ABC
The Russian consulate in Sydney, Australia, where Semyon Boykov resides.
Asked to comment, Boykov told reporters that he could not discuss matters covered by attorney-client privilege, including the extent of support he received from Pravfond. Asked why he had sought funding from an organization that supported Viktor Bout, Boykov said he did not know of any other recipients of Pravfond grants.
“I didn’t know about this foundation… but even if I had, even if I had known [them], I had no problem because I consider them all heroes. They are my compatriots.”
“I think Viktor Bout is a great guy… he’s fantastic. He’s a patriot. I’m a patriot.”
Boykov’s former lawyer said he was only paid by Boykov or his wife and had never had any dealings with Pravfond. The Russian consul did not respond to a request for comment.
From legal support to networks of influence
In nearly two dozen countries, Pravfond funds a network of “legal support centers” that provide Russians with seemingly innocuous legal services, such as document translation and assistance with pensions.
But in some cases, the leaders of these organizations are also key figures in Russian influence operations, seeking to align Russian diaspora media with Kremlin messaging or organizing cultural events for children while receiving instructions from Russian military intelligence.
In a 2017 briefing note found in the emails, a Pravfond consultant describes these centers as a “priority area” for the organization. A 2022 spreadsheet lists 23 active centers, mostly in Europe and former Soviet republics, but also in Jordan, Australia, and Turkey. Many received between €10,000 and €20,000 in support per year.
The centers had a clear ideological mission: in 2022, just days after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Pravfond held a teleconference with all of its legal centers to inform them “of the reasons and goals of Moscow’s decision to conduct a liberation mission in Ukraine,” its director wrote in a 2022 letter to the Russian Foreign Ministry.
He attached a summary describing how the centers in different countries continued their work after the invasion: a Jordanian center helped defend a youth organization called Generation Z from “radical elements of the Ukrainian diaspora,” a French center helped coordinate a lawsuit against banks that refused to service holders of Russian passports, and a Ukrainian center — “unable to carry out its activities too openly, fully, or effectively” in light of the “anti-Russian policies of the Ukrainian authorities” — helped Russian citizens defend themselves against charges of treason.
Some of the local leaders of these centers appear to be active in advancing the Kremlin’s interests.
Among them is Sergei Petrosov, the former head of the Belgian Legal Support Center, who was also the chief web editor and secretary of the Belgian Federation of Russian-Speaking Organizations. The group, which in one of its promotional brochures cites President Putin’s desire for a diaspora that would be “a reliable support for his historical homeland,” has held numerous public events promoting unity between the Russian state and Russians abroad. It also claims to host “the largest Russian cultural event in Belgium.”
Credit: Screenshot of brochure from vksrs.com
The brochure of the Belgian Federation of Russian-Speaking Organizations features Russian President Vladimir Putin.
In 2014, the Belgian federation held a roundtable on “information warfare in the 21st century,” the goal of which, according to a document found in the emails, was to develop policies to help Russian diaspora media more effectively disseminate pro-Russian narratives. A news report about the event, co-authored by Petrosov, noted that the Russian diaspora is “virtually the only instrument for transmitting an alternative point of view and interpretation of current events to public opinion in their countries.”
That same year, Petrosov was an observer at Crimea’s referendum on joining Russia, which was held under Russian occupation and was widely seen as an illegal Russian takeover. He later praised the subsequent annexation as “a restoration of historical justice for which the Russian leadership should be duly recognized.”
Petrosov’s organizations operated for years, but officially closed down about two years later, following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. “We have decided to stop accepting subsidies from Russia,” he told journalists from the Belgian publication Knack last year, referring to sanctions against the country and the “general situation.” Petrosov did not respond to a request for comment.
Another prominent member of the Russian diaspora associated with Pravfond is Yuri Eremenko. Based in Germany, he has for many years headed the Russian website Russkoe Pole, which posts patriotic pro-Russian content and also operates as a kind of virtual legal aid center. In recent years, he has been providing free legal advice to Russians in Germany through a lawyer from Berlin.
The organization, headed by Eremenko’s wife, with Eremenko as her deputy, has received at least €180,000 ($194,400) from Pravfond for this work since 2018. Documents found in the emails show that at least €78,240 was given out and €36,717 received after June 2023, when Pravfond was sanctioned.
The organization the couple runs, the Gagarin Integration Association, also organizes cultural events, Russian language lessons, and drawing classes in the Erfurt area. These events are mainly aimed at children, and Eremenko’s laudatory biography on his website describes him as “the organizer of many projects in the fields of culture, historical memory, and youth work.”
But there is another side to Eremenko’s work. In a report on the activities of his legal center, he describes establishing links with Vadar, an organization advocating for the rights of Russian speakers in Germany that was founded by prominent members of Germany’s far-right AfD party. The relationship, he wrote, “should not be public because of the AfD’s reputation in German society.”
Moreover, sources from two separate European intelligence services claim that Eremenko was in contact with GRU operatives, with one of them claiming to have been instructed by a handler in Unit 54777, which handles psychological operations, to attend the 2016 conference and prepare media coverage of the event in Russia’s favor.
Credit: Screenshot of Facebook post
Pravfond grant recipient and head of the legal aid center Yuri Eremenko (left) and sanctioned GRU officer Sergei Panteleev (right).
Eremenko has been photographed several times with Sergei Panteleev, who is under EU sanctions for being a member of this GRU unit. (Incidentally, the organization Panteleev runs also runs the Pravfond website.) Eremenko and Panteleev did not respond to requests for comment.
Confused about espionage
It was a case of modern espionage with some old-fashioned cinematic flourishes: The conspirators locked their phones in a safe before meeting with FSB go-betweens. They stayed at the dacha of a former KGB colonel. And they received thousands of euros in cash.
These details, recently revealed in Pravfond emails, come from the case of Algirdas Paleckis, a Lithuanian politician currently serving a five-and-a-half-year prison sentence for espionage.
He was tasked with helping the Russian government thwart a high-profile trial in his home country that has outraged Moscow: the prosecution of 67 former Soviet officers and officials for war crimes committed during the attempt to suppress Lithuania’s independence movement in January 1991.
Paleckis and his accomplice were recruited to provide the Russians with the home addresses of Lithuanian judges and prosecutors involved in the trial. (The accomplice cooperated with authorities and was cleared of criminal liability.)
Pravfond was also involved behind the scenes, its emails show. The organization funded a small grant for Paleckis’s legal aid, larger grants to defend several former Soviet officials, and a public relations campaign that sought to publicize their case.
Pravfond also assisted and collaborated with numerous intelligence officials, joining an effort that Lithuanian intelligence agencies say was “coordinated by the Russian presidential administration and the FSB.”
Their assessment was cited in the appellate court ruling in the Paleckis case, revealed in the emails, shedding further light on Pravfond’s ties to the world of espionage.
Photo: Erikas Ovcharenko/BNS Foto
Lithuanian politician Algirdas Paleckis is serving a five-and-a-half-year prison sentence for espionage.
The court decision repeatedly names two men who helped recruit Paleckis. One was Mikhail Golovatov, a colonel who led the KGB’s elite Alpha Group during the 1991 purges. The other was a go-between for Paleckis and Golovatov, a former Alpha officer named Eduard Kruglov.
Both men, described as having close ties to the FSB, had multiple dealings with Pravfond.
Golovatov himself was a prominent defendant in the mass trial — and Pravfond generously funded his legal defense to the tune of more than $30,000. He was found guilty along with 66 other defendants and sentenced in absentia to 12 years in prison before he died in 2022.
Credit: Pravfond email
Pravfond director Alexander Udaltsov (left) and Mikhail Golovatov (right), a former KGB colonel closely associated with the FSB.
Kruglov’s email address appears more than 300 times in Pravfond emails, indicating regular contact with Deputy Director Pozdorovkin. In the emails, he discusses the defense of another defendant in the Vilnius case, a tank driver named Yuri Mel, who took part in the storming of the TV tower in the Lithuanian capital.
Mel became a high-profile case among patriotic Russians, becoming one of two men jailed in the case. Pravfond paid Lithuanian lawyers at least €111,000 to represent him over several years. Mel was sentenced to seven years in prison in 2019 and returned to Russia after his release.
Pravfond also financed a PR campaign aimed at discrediting the Lithuanian investigation. It was carried out by the organization Our Compatriots, founded by Golovatov and consisting of former KGB and FSB officers associated with the events of 1991.
The organization’s president, Vladimir Derevnin, was a KGB veteran who used an email address under the pseudonym “VladimirFSB.” Contracts and documents found in the emails show that with the money of the Pravofond, Our Compatriots held a television roundtable on the events of 1991, organized a photo exhibition in the State Duma, and implemented other socially significant projects.
“The trial of January 13 directly challenges the Kremlin’s myth of Soviet greatness,” said Nerijus Maliukevicius, a political scientist at Vilnius University. “That is why Lithuania is subjected to constant and targeted information attacks focused on this topic.”
“These are not isolated incidents, but part of a long-term information war,” he said. “The Pravfond case is yet another confirmation of this strategy.”
Paletskis, Kruglov and Derevnin did not respond to requests for comment.
“To create a positive image of Russia”
Pravfond spends a significant portion of its resources on projects to influence public opinion in a pro-Russian direction. Dozens of contracts found by journalists in the email archive concern work with the media.
For example, in Greece, Pravfond has funded the Dialogos Club, a Greek-Russian association whose website states that its goal is “to shape a positive image of Russia in Greece and Greece in Russia.” Dialogos has held a number of conferences with Pravfond’s support, including events dedicated to Soviet achievements in World War II and honoring the Russian constitution. In 2020, it held an online seminar on “objectivity in journalism in the context of hybrid information warfare,” and Pravfond funded a book based on its findings.
In an email promoting the book’s publication, Theodoros Ignatiades, head of Dialogos, points to its timeliness in the context of “the information and hybrid war being waged against Russia,” including through “dirty fakes” in “mainstream media,” and praises the publication of the book, which reflects “true alternative opinions of renowned experts.” Ignatiades did not respond to requests for comment.
Another Pravfond grant recipient, the prolific Latvian digital media outlet IMHOclub, has published hundreds of articles with headlines like “Why is Latvia making Russia its enemy?” and “Well, Balts, how are things without Lenin?”, in which numerous authors criticize Latvia and the European Union and express support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Three IMHOclub employees, including its co-founder, journalist Yuri Alekseyev, were arrested in November 2018 and charged with committing acts against Latvian sovereignty. The defendants maintain their innocence. Two have fled the country, attending their final hearing on April 11 remotely.
Documents in the email archive show that Pravfond has provided IMHOclub with at least 6.4 million rubles ($65,800) since 2022, including to host a virtual “anti-fascist conference” attended by pro-Russian activists and politicians from various countries, which resulted in an anti-Ukrainian resolution intended for submission to the UN and other international bodies. Pravfond also paid almost 17,000 euros to cover the defendants’ legal costs.
IMHOclub’s most recent available application to Pravfond, in which the organization requested 9.6 million rubles ($127,000) to continue publishing and expand its presence to Moldova and Poland, was aimed at “countering the demonization of Russians in Europe” and “forming a loyal attitude of European citizens toward Russia.”
In this case, Pravfond decided to fund only a fifth of the requested amount, prompting IMHOclub to write a letter to Udaltsov, reminding him of their decade-long collaboration and asking for more funding in the future. However, despite the limited funding, IMHOClub’s work continues. The organization and Alekseev did not respond to requests for comment.
Pravfond is also active in Moldova, a country where Russian influence is a sensitive topic. Among his grantees in the country was Alexey Petrovich, a pro-Kremlin activist whose organization received nearly half a million rubles ($7,500) for a traveling exhibition called “Immortal Stalingrad” dedicated to the Soviet Union’s victory in World War II, while Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine raged next door.
Petrovich, dressed in a military uniform, visited several schools to talk about the famous battle, an event that public television in the pro-Russian region of Gagauzia described as a “lesson in patriotism.”
Credit: Screenshot of a Facebook post by Alexey Petrovich
Pro-Kremlin activist Alexey Petrovich.
In response to a reporter’s questions, Petrovich said that another exhibition, “Immortal Stalingrad,” from a few years ago, was not funded by Pravfond. He also said that its purpose was only to educate about history: “We did not talk about the war in Ukraine, we did not connect it to this context, but spoke exclusively about historical facts,” he said. He did not answer questions about the 2022 exhibition.
The list of projects goes on. For example, Pravfond also funded the online publication of a Lithuanian history textbook — with a foreword by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov — which presented the country’s occupation by the Soviet Union in a positive light.
As recently as April of this year, new requests for money continued to arrive. One applicant asked for 11.5 million rubles ($125,000) to support five Telegram channels in the Baltics, which “have already begun to unite [pro-Russian bloggers] into a single virtual network.” Another Telegram project, according to its own application, “has been repeatedly mentioned in the Danish press as an example of Russian propaganda.”
But at least one of Pravfond’s leaders held his beliefs sincerely.
In a personal email to a friend, sent just months before his death in August 2024, former executive director Igor Panevkin wrote that many Russian expats living abroad “have stopped believing in Western democracy and [its] goals, which distort the very essence of humanity.”
“I am not writing this as propaganda,” he added. “I sincerely believe that Russia has a more correct historical path.”
Inga Springe (Re:Baltica), Guna Glaizde (Nekā personīga; TV3 Latvia), Marcela Zamosteanu (RISE Moldova), Mindaugas Aušra (LRT), Indre Makaraityte (LRT), Hannes Münsinger (Paper Trail Media), Kristina Weinbender (investigace.cz), Damien Leloup (Le Monde) and Sean Nicholls (Australian Broadcasting Corporation) contributed reporting.
Update 21 May 2025: A response to a request for comment from Sergei Sidorov was received after publication and added to the article.
